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Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic
6.1 Introduction
The story of technological progress is the invention and subsequent im-
plementation ofimprovedmethodsofproduction.Allmodelsofgrowthin-
corporatethisnotioninsomeway.Forexample,thecelebratedSolow(1956)
modelassumesthattechnological progress and its implementation are both
free. Technological progress rains down as manna from heaven and im-
proves the productivity of all factors of production, new and old alike.
Basedonhisearliermodel,Solow(1957)proposedwhathassincebecome
the dominant growth-accounting framework. Its central equation is y 
zF(k,l),whereyisoutput,kandlarethequality-uncorrectedinputsofcapi-
tal(computed using the perpetual inventory method) and labor, and z is a
measure of the state of technology. If k and l were homogenous, then this
would be the right way to proceed. In principle, the framework would
allow one to separate the contribution of what is measured, k and l,f r o m
what is not measured, z. Now, neither k nor l is homogenous in practice,
but one could perhaps hope that some type of aggregation result would
validate the procedure—if not exactly, then at least as an approximation.
The problem with this approach is that it treats all vintages of capital
(or for that matter labor) as alike. In reality, advances in technology tend
to be embodied in the latest vintages of capital. This means that new capi-
tal is better than old capital, not just because machines suﬀer wear and
179tear as they age, but also because new capital is better than the old capital
waswhenthelatterwasnew.Italsomeansthattherecanbenotechnological
progresswithoutinvestment.Ifthisiswhatthe“embodimentoftechnology
in capital” means, then it cannot be captured by the Solow (1956, 1957)
framework, for reasons that Solow (1960, 90) himself aptly describes:
It is as if all technical progress were something like time-and-motion
study, a way of improving the organization and operation of inputs with-
out reference to the nature of the inputs themselves. The striking as-
sumption is that old and new capital equipment participate equally in
technical progress. This conﬂicts with the casual observation that many
if not most innovations need to be embodied in new kinds of durable
equipment before they can be made eﬀective. Improvements in technol-
ogy aﬀect output only to the extent that they are carried into practice
either by net capital formation or by the replacement of old-fashioned
equipment by the latest models . . .
In other words, in contrast to Solow (1956, 1957), implementation is not
free. It requires the purchase of new machines. Moreover, it requires new
human capital, too, because workers and management must learn the new
technology. This will take place either through experience or through
training, or both. This type of technological progress is labelled here as
investment speciﬁc; you must invest to realize the beneﬁts from it.
If this view is correct, growth accounting should allow for many types
of physical and human capital, each speciﬁc at least in part to the technol-
ogy that it embodies. In other words, accounting for growth should pro-
ceed in a vintage capital framework. This paper argues that a vintage capi-
tal model can shed light on some key features of the postwar growth
experience of the United States. The well-known models of Lucas (1988)
and Romer (1990) do not ﬁt into this framework. In Lucas’s model, all
physical capital, new and old alike, “participates equally” in the techno-
logical progress that the human capital sector generates; and, as Solow’s
quote emphasizes, this does not ﬁt in with casual observation about how
technological progress works. In contrast, Romer’s model is a vintage capi-
tal model. New capital goods are invented every period—but new capital
isn’t better than old capital. It simply is diﬀerent and expands the menu of
available inputs, and production is assumed to be more eﬃcient when
there is a longer menu of inputs available. Thus capital does not become
obsolete as it ages—an implication that denies the obvious fact that old
technologies are continually being replaced by new ones.
6.1.1 Summary of the Argument and Results
Diﬀerent variants of Solow’s (1960) vintage capital model are explored
here. To begin, however, a stab is made at accounting for postwar U.S.
growth using the standard Solow (1957) framework.
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Solow’s (1957) model is the dominant growth-accounting framework,
and section 6.2 uses it in a brief growth-accounting exercise for the post-
war period. The bottom line is that this model is unable to deal with these
four facts:
1. The prolonged productivity slowdown that started around 1973. To ex-
plain the slowdown the model insists that technological progress has been
dormant since 1973! This, of course, is greatly at odds with casual empiri-
cism: personal computers, cellular telephones, robots, and the Internet,
inter alia.
2. The falling price of capital goods relative to consumption goods. This
price has declined by 4 percent per year over the postwar period, and it is
a symptom of the obsolescence of old capital caused by the arrival of
better, new capital. This relative price decline of capital is not consistent
with a one-sector growth model such as Solow’s (1956, 1957).
3. The productivity of a best-practice plant is much larger than that of the
average plant. They can diﬀer by a factor of two, three, or more, depending
on the industry. This is at odds with a model such as Solow’s (1956, 1957),
in which all ﬁrms use the same production function.
4. The recent rise in wage inequality. The framework is silent on this.
Why the Baseline Vintage Capital Model Is Unsatisfactory
Section 6.3 introduces the baseline vintage capital model of Solow
(1960), in which technological progress is exogenous and embodied in the
form of new capital goods. Using the price of new equipment relative to
consumption, the technological improvement in equipment is estimated to
be 4 percent per annum during the postwar period. This makes the eﬀec-
tive capital stock grow faster than it does in conventional estimates. As a
consequence, the implied productivity slowdown after 1973 is even bigger
than the estimate obtained from the Solow (1957) framework! This spells
trouble for frameworks that identify total factor productivity (TFP) as a
measure of technological progress, a datum that Abramovitz once labelled
“a measure of our ignorance.” Can Solow’s (1960) framework rationalize
the slowdown?
Adding Diﬀusion Lags and Technology-Speciﬁc Learning
to the Baseline Vintage Model
One adjustment to the vintage capital model that can produce a produc-
tivity slowdown is the introduction of a technology-speciﬁc learning curve
on the part of users of capital goods. The eﬀects of learning can be ampli-
ﬁed further if spillovers in learning among capital goods users are added.
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technologies. The analysis assumes that the vintage-speciﬁce ﬃciency of
investment starts growing faster in the early 1970s with the advent of infor-
mation technologies, and that the new technologies have steep learning
curves. Furthermore, it is presumed that it takes some time for these tech-
nologies to diﬀuse through the economy. This leads to a vintage capital
explanation of the “productivity slowdown” as a period of above-normal
unmeasured investment in human capital speciﬁc to the technologies that
came on-line starting in the early 1970s.
Implications for Wage Inequality
The productivity slowdown was accompanied by a rise in the skill pre-
mium. It is highly probable that the two phenomena are related, and sec-
tion 6.5 explains why. There are two kinds of explanations for the recent
rise in inequality. The ﬁrst, proposed by Griliches (1969), emphasizes the
role of skill in the use of capital goods, and is labelled “capital-skill com-
plementarity.” The second hypothesis, ﬁrst proposed by Nelson and Phelps
(1966), emphasizes the role of skill in implementing the new technology,
and is labelled “skill in adoption.” Both explanations can be nested in a
vintage capital model.
Endogenizing Growth in the Vintage Model
Section 6.6 presents three models in which growth is endogenous, each
based on a diﬀerent engine of growth. Each engine requires a diﬀerent fuel
to run it. To analyze economic growth one needs to know what the impor-
tant engines are; each one will have diﬀerent implications for how re-
sources should be allocated across the production of current and future
consumptions.
Learning by doing as an engine. Section 6.6.1 describes Arrow’s (1962)
model of growth through learning by doing in the capital goods sector.
Learning by doing is the engine that ﬁts most closely with Solow’s (1960)
original vintagecapital modelbecause the technologicalgrowth thatit gen-
erates uses no resources. That is, all employed labor and capital are devoted
to producing either capital goods or consumption goods. As capital goods
producers’ eﬃciency rises, the relative price of capital goods falls.
Research as an engine. Section 6.6.2 highlights Krusell’s (1998) model of
R&D in the capital goods sector. Here each capital goods producer must
decide how much labor to hire to increase the eﬃciency of the capital good
he sells.
Human capital as an engine. Section 6.6.3 assumes that capital goods pro-
ducers can switch to a better technology if they accumulate the requisite
182 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic1. The average cost of implementation may, however, be declining in the number of users
because of synergies in adoption.
2. Jovanovic and Rob (1998) compare Solow’s (1956, 1960) frameworks against the back-
drop of cross-country growth experience.
technology-speciﬁc expertise. The section extends Parente’s (1994) model
in which the cost of raising one’s productive eﬃciency is the output fore-
gone while the new technology is brought up to speed through learning.
What does the power system look like? These three models have a common
structure: Each has a consumption-goods and a capital-goods sector, and
each has endogenous technological progress in the capital goods sector
only. This technological progress is then passed onto ﬁnal output produc-
ers in the form of a “pecuniary external eﬀect” transmitted by the falling
relative price of capital. Each model focuses exclusively on one growth
engine, however; and while this simpliﬁes the exposition, it does not convey
an idea of how much each engine matters to growth as a whole.
Unless its discovery was accidental, whenever a new technology appears
on society’s menu, society pays an invention cost. Then, society must pay
an implementation cost—the cost of the physical and human capital spe-
ciﬁc to the new technology. Society needs to pay an invention cost only
once per technology, whereas the implementation cost must be paid once
per user.1 After this, there are only the costs of using the technology—
“production costs.” Not surprisingly, then, society spends much less on re-
search than it does on the various costs of implementing technologies.
Even in the United States, Jovanovic (1997) has estimated that implemen-
tation costs outweigh research costs by a factor of about 20:1.
Because people must learn how to use new technologies, it follows that
the learning costs associated with the adoption of such technologies—be
they in the form of schooling, experience, or on-the-job training—are ines-
capable at the level of a country. Because the object of this exercise is ac-
counting for growth in the United States, one can conclude that schooling,
experience, and training are, in some combination, essential for growth to
occur.2 Research, on the other hand, clearly is not, because the majority
of the world’s nations have grown not by inventing their own technologies,
but by implementing technologies invented by others. Presumably, the
United States could do the same (assuming that other countries would
then be advancing the frontiers of knowledge).
6.1.2 Why Models Matter for Growth Accounting
In its early days, the Cowles Commission’s message was that aside from
satisfying one’s intellectual curiosity about how the world works, economic
models would, on a practical level, (a) allow one to predict the conse-
quences of out-of-sample variation in policies and other exogenous vari-
Accounting for Growth 1833. “We should like to have both a rapid increase in aggregate output and stability in its
composition—the former to keep pace with expanding wants, and the latter to avoid the
losses of specialized equipment of entrepreneurs and crafts of employees and creating ‘sick’
industries in which resources are less mobile than customers. It is highly probable that the
goals are inconsistent” (Stigler 1947, 30).
ables; (b) guide the measurement of variables; and (c) allow one to deal
with simultaneity problems. These points apply to economic models gen-
erally, and they certainly relate to the value of models that explain growth.
It is worth explaining why.
Policy analysis. Denison (1964, 90) claimed that “the whole embodied
question is of little importance for policy in the United States.” He based
this assertion on his calculation that a one-year change in the average age
of capital would have little impact on the output. This misses the point.
Diﬀerent models will suggest diﬀerent growth-promoting policies. For in-
stance, in the version of Arrow’s (1962) learning-by-doing model presented
here, there are industry-wide spillover eﬀects in capital goods production,
and a policy that subsidized capital goods production would improve wel-
f a r e .I nP a r e n t e ’s (1994) model, however, capital goods producers fully
internalize the eﬀects of any investment in technology-speciﬁc expertise.
Such a world is eﬃcient. Government policies may promote growth, but
only at the expense of welfare. Other policy questions arise. Vintage capital
models predict a continual displacement of old technologies by more eﬃ-
c i e n tn e wo n e s .I faw o r k e rn e e d st ot r a i nt ow o r kat e c h n o l o g y ,t h e na sa
technology becomes obsolete so does the worker. This may have implica-
tions for such things as unemployment. These considerations had, long
ago, led Stigler to conclude that job insecurity is the price that society
must pay for progress.3
The measurement of variables. Economic theory provides a guide about
which things should be measured and how to measure them. For example,
the baseline vintage capital model developed here suggests that the decline
in the relative price of new equipment can be identiﬁed with the pace
of technological progress in the equipment goods sector. It also provides
guidance on how the aggregate stock of equipment should be measured—
and this stock grows more quickly than the corresponding National In-
come and Product Accounts (NIPA) measure. More generally, in a world
with investment-speciﬁc technological progress, new capital goods will be
more productive than old ones. The rental prices for new and old capital
goods are indicators of the amount of investment-speciﬁc technological
progress. For example, the diﬀerence in rents between old and new oﬃce
buildings (or the rent gradient) can be used to shed light on the amount of
technological progress that there has been in structures.
Investment in physical capital is counted in the NIPA, whereas invest-
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put tomorrow in just the same way as investment in physical capital does.
This is sometimes referred to as the unmeasured investment problem. In
the United States, R&D spending amounts to about 3 percent of GDP.
The costs of implementing new technologies, in terms of schooling, on-
the-job training, and so on, may amount to 10 percent of GDP. The models
of Krusell (1998) and Parente (1994) suggest that such expenditures are as
vital to the production of future output as is investment in equipment and
structures. In the NIPA such expenditures are expensed or deducted from
a ﬁrm’sp r o ﬁts, as opposed to being capitalized into proﬁts as when a
ﬁrm makes a new investment good. By this accounting, GDP would be 13
percent higher if these unmeasured investments were taken into account.
This, indeed, is one way the vintage capital model can perhaps explain
the productivity slowdown—the vintage of technologies that arrived
around 1974 was promising but was subject to a protracted learning curve
and high adoption costs. The productivity slowdown took place, in other
words, because there was a lot of unmeasured investment. Conventional
growth accounting practices will understate productivity growth to the ex-
tent that they underestimate output growth due to these unmeasured in-
vestments. This might suggest that more eﬀort should be put into collect-
ing aggregate data on R&D and adoption costs.
Simultaneity problems. Conventional growth accounting uses an aggregate
production function to decompose output growth into technological prog-
ress and changes in inputs in a way that uses minimal economic theory.
Clearly, though, a large part of the growth in the capital stock—equipment
and structures—is due to technological progress. The general equilibrium
approach taken here allows for the growth in capital stock to be broken
down into its underlying sources of technological progress. Furthermore,
it links the observed decline in the price of new equipment with the rate
of technological progress in the production of new equipment. More gen-
erally, models allow one to connect observed rent gradients on buildings
to the rate of technological progress in structures, and they allow one to
connect the long diﬀusion lags of products and technologies to the costs
of adopting them. Models lead to more precise inferences about such si-
multaneities.
6.2 Solow (1957) and Neutral Technological Progress
In one of those rare papers that changes the courses of economics, So-
low (1957) proposed a way of measuring technological progress. Suppose
output, y, is produced according to the constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion function
() ( ,) , 1 yz F k l =
Accounting for Growth 1854. In fact, over the whole period it grew on average at the paltry rate of 0.96 percent
per year.
where k and l are the inputs of capital and labor. The variable z measures
the state of technology in the economy, and technological progress is neu-
tral. Over time, z grows, reﬂecting technological improvement in the econ-
omy. Thus, for a given level of inputs, k and l, more output, y, can be pro-
duced.
For any variable x,l e tgx  (1/x)(dx/dt) denote its rate of growth. If the
economy is competitive, then the rate of technological progress can be
measured by
(2) gg g zy l k l =− // , 	
where 	 represents capital’s share of income.
The rate of technological progress, gz, can easily be computed from
equation (2), given data on GDP, y, the capital stock, k, hours worked, l,
and labor’s share of income, 1 	 . Figure 6.1 plots z for the postwar
period. Note that the growth in z slows down dramatically around 1973.4
This is often referred to as the “productivity slowdown.” Does it seem
reasonable to believe that technological progress has been dormant since
1973? Hardly. Casual empiricism speaks to the contrary: computers, ro-
bots, cellular telephones, and so on.
Perhaps part of the explanation is that some quality change in output
goes unmeasured so that gy was understated. However, the above measures
Fig. 6.1 Standard measure of neutral technological progress
186 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic5. Benhabib and Rustichini (1991) relax this assumption and allow for a variable rate of
substitution in production between capital stocks of diﬀerent vintages.
of k and l do not control for quality change, and this biases things in the
other direction and makes the puzzle seem even larger. Is something wrong
with the notion of technological progress in the Solow (1957) model? The
remaining sections analyze vintage capital models in which technological
progress is investment speciﬁc.
6.3 Solow (1960) and Investment-Speciﬁc Technological Progress
In a lesser-known paper, Solow (1960) developed a model that embodies
technological progress in the form of new capital goods.
The production of ﬁnal output. Suppose that output is produced according
to the constant-returns-to-scale production function
() (,) . 3 yF k l =
Note that there is no neutral technological progress. Output can be used
for two purposes: consumption, c, and gross investment, i. Thus, the econ-
omy’s resource constraint reads: c  i  F(k,l)
Capital accumulation. Now, suppose that capital accumulation is governed
by the law of motion
() , 4 dk
dt
iq k =− 
where i is gross investment and  is the rate of physical depreciation on
capital. Here q represents the current state of technology for producing
new equipment. As q rises more new capital goods can be produced for a
unit of forgone output or consumption. This form of technological prog-
ress is speciﬁc to the investment goods sector of the economy. Therefore,
changes in q are dubbed investment-speciﬁc technological progress. Two
important implications of equation (4) are:
1. In order to realize the gains from this form of technological progress
there must be investment in the economy. This is not the case for neutral
technological progress, as assumed in Solow (1957).
2. Eﬃciency units of capital of diﬀerent vintages can be aggregated lin-
early in equation (3) using the appropriate weights on past investments:
k(t)  ∫
∞
0 esq(t  s)i(t  s)ds.5
The relative price of capital. In a competitive equilibrium the relative price
of new capital goods, p, would be given by p  1/q, because this shows
Accounting for Growth 187how much output or consumption goods must be given up in order to
purchase a new unit of equipment. Therefore, in the above framework it
is easy to identify the investment-speciﬁc technological shift factor, q,b y
using a price series for new capital goods—that is, by using the relation-
ship q  1/p.
Growth accounting in the baseline model. Figure 6.2 shows the price series
for new equipment and the implied series for the investment technology
shock. Look at how much better this series represents technological prog-
ress. It rises more or less continuously throughout the postwar period;
there is no productivity slowdown here.
So how much postwar economic growth is due to investment-speciﬁc
versus neutral technological progress? To gauge this, assume that output
is given by the production function
() , 5
1 yz k k l es
es e s =
−− 		 	 	
where ke and ks represent the stocks of equipment and structures in the
economy. Let equipment follow a law of motion similar to equation (4)
so that




ee e =− 
where ie is gross investment in equipment measured in consumption units
and e is the rate of physical depreciation. Thus, equipment is subject to
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Fig. 6.2 Relative price of equipment, p, and investment-speciﬁc technological
progress, q6. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) have used this structure for growth account-
ing. Hulten (1992) employs a similar setup but replaces the resource constraint with c  ieq
 is  y. See Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) for a discussion on the implications
of this substitution.
7. This is what Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) estimated.
8. The second part of the appendix works out what would happen if a growth accountant
failed to incorporate investment-speciﬁc technological advance into his analysis.
investment-speciﬁc technological progress. The law of motion for struc-
tures is written as




ss s =− 
where is represents gross investment in structures measured in consump-
tion units and s is the rate of physical depreciation. The economy’sr e -
source constraint now reads6
() . 8 ci i y es ++=
It is easy to calculate from equation (5), in conjunction with equations
(6)–(8), that along the economy’s balanced path the rate of growth in in-
come is given by




















To use this formula, numbers are needed for 	e, 	s, gz,a n dqq. Let 	e  0.17
and 	s  0.13.7 Over the postwar period the rate of investment-speciﬁc
technological progress averaged 4 percent per year, a fact that can be com-
puted from the series shown for q in ﬁgure 6.2. Hence, gq  0.04. Next, a
measure for z can be obtained from the production relationship in equa-
tion (5) that implies z  (y/[k	e
e k	s
s l1	e	s]). Given data on y, ke, ks,a n dl
the series for z can be computed. These series are all readily available,
except for ke. This series can be constructed using the law of motion in
equation (6) and data for q and ie. In line with NIPA, the rate of physical
depreciation on equipment was taken to be 12.4 percent, so that e 
0.124. Following this procedure, the average rate of neutral technological
advance was estimated to be 0.38 percent. Equation (9) then implies that
investment-speciﬁc technological progress accounted for 63 percent of
output growth, whereas neutral technological advance accounted for 35
percent.8
Why the baseline model is not adequate. All is not well with this model,
however. With the quality change correction in the capital stock, it grows
faster than did k in the Solow (1957) version. When this revised series is
inserted into the production function for ﬁnal goods, the implied produc-
Accounting for Growth 189tivity slowdown is even bigger than that arising from the Solow (1957)
framework. How can this slowdown be explained? The introduction of lags
in learning about how to use new technologies to their full potential, and
lags in the diﬀusion of new technologies, seems to do the trick.
6.4 Adjusting the Baseline Solow (1960) Model
This section introduces lags in learning and diﬀusion of new technolo-
gies. The setting is necessarily one in which plants diﬀer in the technologies
they use. As will be seen, it turns out that aggregation to a simple growth
model cannot be guaranteed in such settings. Some conditions on technol-
ogy and the vintage structure that ensure Solow (1960) aggregation are
presented.
6.4.1 Heterogeneity across Plants and the Aggregation of Capital
Notation. Some of the following variables are plant speciﬁc. Because
plants of diﬀerent ages, , will coexist at any date, one sometimes needs to
distinguish these variables with a double index. The notation x(t) will de-
note the value of the variable x at date t in a plant that is  years old. The
plant’s vintage is then v  t  . Variables that are not plant speciﬁc will
be indexed by t alone. Moreover, the index t will be dropped whenever pos-
sible.
Production of ﬁnal goods. Final goods are produced in a variety of plants.
A plant is indexed by its vintage. Thus, the output of a plant of age  is
described by the production function
yz k l  
	

 	 =< + < ,, 01
where z is the plant’s TFP and k and l are the stocks of capital and labor
that it employs. For now, z is exogenous. A plant’s capital depreciates at
the rate  and cannot be augmented once in place.
Investment-speciﬁc technological progress. Recall that gq is the rate of
investment-speciﬁc technological progress. Then, as before, an eﬃciency
unit of new capital costs 1/q(t)  p(t)  egqt units of consumption in pe-
riod t. The period t cost of the capital for new plant is therefore k0(t)/q(t).
Optimal hiring of labor. A price-taking plant of age  will hire labor up to
the point where the marginal product of labor equals the wage, w.H e n c e ,
zk 	
l1
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Labor market clearing. Suppose that there are n plants operating of age .
If the aggregate endowment of labor is ﬁxed at h, then labor market clear-
ing requires that




Substituting equation (10) into the above formula then allows the follow-
ing expression to be obtained for the market clearing wage
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Aggregate output. Aggregate output is the sum of outputs across all the
plants: y  ∫
∞
0nyd. It therefore equals
(13) y
hn z k d
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Solow (1960) aggregation. This model is similar to the benchmark vintage
capital model. In fact, it aggregates to it exactly if the following three as-
sumptions hold:
1. Returns to scale are constant (so that 	1  ).
2. Total factor productivity is the same in all plants (so that z  z).
3. The number of plants of each vintage does not change over time.
That is, ntv(t)  n0(v), or equivalently, n(t)  n0(t  ), since v  t  .I n
other words, all investment is in the current vintage plants, and plants last
forever—only their capital wears oﬀ asymptotically.
In this situation, y  zh1	k	, where the aggregate capital stock k is deﬁned
by k(t)  ∫
t
∞ntv(t)ktv(t)dv. Now capital in each plant depreciates at the
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ment matters, and not how it is divided among plants.
10. Even without these assumptions, the model will behave similarly in balanced growth.
Assume for the moment that the number of plants is constant through time so that n  n
and z g r o w sa tr a t egz. The supply of labor will be constant in balanced growth. Now, along
a balanced growth path, output and investment must grow at a constant rate, gy. This implies
that i  nk0/q must grow at this rate, too. Therefore, k0 must grow at rate gy  gq. Clearly, to
have balanced growth, all of the k’s should grow at the same rate. Consequently, k will grow
at rate gy  gq. It is easy to deduce from equation (13) that the rate of growth in output will
be given by gy  (1/y)(dy/dt)  [(1/1 	 )gz]  [(	/1 	 )gq]. This formula is identical in
form to equation (9). (To see this, set 	s  0a n d	e 	in equation [9]).
11. From note 10, it is known that along a balanced growth path, k0(t) must grow at rate
gy  gq, where gy is the growth rate of output and gq is the growth rate of q.I ti se a s yt o
check that gy  gq  gq/(1 	 )  .
Moreover, by assumption (3), [dntv(t)]/dt  0 for any v  t. Therefore,
dt
dt
tq t i t k k () () ()() , =− + 
where i(t)  [n0(t)k0(t)]/q(t) is gross investment (measured in consumption
units).9 If one identiﬁes h and k with l and k in equations (3) and (4), the
two models will have identical predictions.10
So, for the above vintage capital model to diﬀer in a signiﬁcant way
from the benchmark model with investment-speciﬁc technological prog-
ress, some combination of assumptions (1), (2), and (3) must be relaxed.
Without this, the model will be unable to resolve the productivity slow-
down puzzle.
Lumpy investment assumption. Now, for the rest of section 6.4, suppose
that the blueprints for a new plant at date t call for a ﬁxed lump of capital,
k0(t). Let k0(t) grow at the constant rate   gq/(1 	 ) over time.11 That
is, the eﬃciency units of capital embodied by a new plant at date t are
equal to k0(t)  et. A plant built at date t then embodies et  (egqt)1/(1	)
eﬃciency units of capital. Thus, the consumption cost of building a new
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Therefore, the ratio of the capital stock between a new plant and a plant
that is  periods old will be given by k0/k  e(), where  is the rate of
physical depreciation on capital. Together with equation (11) this implies
that lim→∞y/y0  0 so that, relative to new plants, old plants will wither
away over time. In what follows, set 0.
6.4.2 Learning Eﬀects
Established skills are often destroyed, and productivity can temporarily
fall upon a switch to a new technology. In its early phases, then, a new
192 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovictechnology may be operated ineﬃciently because of a dearth of expe-
rience.
Evidence on learning eﬀects. A mountain of evidence attests to the presence
of such learning eﬀects.
1. An interesting case study, undertaken by David (1975), is the Law-
rence no. 2 cotton mill. This mill was operated in the U.S. antebellum
period, and detailed inventory records show that no new equipment was
added between 1836 and 1856. Yet, output per hour grew at 2.3 percent
per year over the period. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) present a variety
of learning curves for activities such as angioplasty surgery to steel ﬁnish-
ing; see Argotte and Epple (1990) for a survey of case studies on learning
curves.
2. After analyzing 2,000 ﬁrms from forty-one industries spanning the
period 1973–86, Bahk and Gort (1993) ﬁnd that a plant’s productivity
increases by 15 percent over the ﬁrst fourteen years of its life due to learn-
ing eﬀects.
The learning curve. A simple functional form for the learning curve will
now be assumed. Suppose that as a function of its age, , a plant’s time t
TFP z(t)d o e sn o td e p e n do nt p e rs e ,b u to n l yo n,a sf o l l o w s :
zz e 
  =−
−− (* ) . 1
1
Thus, as a plant ages it becomes more productive, due (for example) to
learning by doing. Observe that z0  (1  z*)1,s ot h a t1 (1  z*)1
is the “amount to be learned.” Moreover, z is bounded above by one so
that you can only do so much with any particular technology. Times of
rapid technological progress are likely to have steeper learning curves.
That is, z* is likely to be positively related to the rate of investment-speciﬁc
technological progress, gq. The bigger gq is, the less familiar the latest gen-
eration of capital goods will look, and the more there will be with which
to get acquainted. Therefore assume that
(15) zg q *. = 

In what follows, assume that 0.70, 1.2, 0.3, and 12. With
this choice of parameter values, the learning curve shows a fairly quick
rate of learning in that a plant’s full potential is reached in about ﬁfteen
years (when gq takes its postwar value of 0.04).
6.4.3 Diﬀusion Lags
Evidence. Diﬀusion refers to the spread of a new technology through an
economy. The diﬀusion of innovations is slow, but its pace seems to be
increasing over time. In a classic study Gort and Klepper (1982) examined
Accounting for Growth 19312. For instance, David (1991) attributes the slow adoption of electricity in manufacturing
during the early 1900s partly to the durability of old plants’ use of mechanical power derived
from water and steam. Those industries undergoing rapid expansion and hence rapid net
investment—tobacco, fabricated metal, transportation, and equipment—tended to adopt
electricity ﬁrst.
forty-six product innovations, beginning with phonograph records in 1887
and ending with lasers in 1960. The authors traced diﬀusion by examining
the number of ﬁrms that were producing the new product over time. On
average, only two or three ﬁrms were producing each new product for the
ﬁrst fourteen years after its commercial development; then the number of
ﬁrms sharply increased (on average six ﬁrms per year over the next ten
years). Prices fell rapidly following the inception of a new product (13
percent a year for the ﬁrst twenty-four years). Using a twenty-one-product
subset of the Gort and Klepper data, Jovanovic and Lach (1997) report
that it took approximately ﬁfteen years for the output of a new product to
rise from the 10 percent to the 90 percent diﬀusion level. They also cite
evidence from a study of 265 innovations that found that a new innovation
took forty-one years on average to move from the 10 percent to the 90
percent diﬀusion level. Gru ¨bler (1991) also presents evidence on how fast
these products spread after they are invented. For example, in the United
States the steam locomotive took ﬁfty-four years to move from the 10 per-
cent to the 90 percent diﬀusion level, whereas the diesel (a smaller innova-
tion) took twelve years. It took approximately twenty-ﬁve years from the
time the ﬁrst diesel locomotive was introduced in 1925 to the time that
diesels accounted for half of the locomotives in use, which occurred some-
where between 1951 and 1952.
Theories of diﬀusion lags. Diﬀusion lags seem to have several distinct or-
igins:
1. Vintage-speciﬁc physical capital. If, in a vintage capital model, a ﬁrm
can use just one technology at a time, as in Parente (1994), it faces a re-
placement problem. New equipment is costly, whereas old, inferior equip-
ment has been paid for. Hence it is optimal to wait a while before replacing
an old machine with a new, better one.12 Furthermore, not everyone can
adopt at the same time because the economy’s capacity to produce equip-
ment is ﬁnite. This implies some smoothing in adoption, and a smooth
diﬀusion curve.
2. Vintage-speciﬁc human capital. The slow learning of new technolo-
gies acts to make adoption costly and slow it down, a fact that Parente
(1994) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) emphasize. Adoption of a
new technology may also be delayed because it is diﬃcult at ﬁrst to hire
experienced people to work with them, as Chari and Hopenhayn (1991)
emphasize.
194 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic13. The diﬀusion of technology has steadily gotten faster over the last century (Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas 1997, exhibit D). Search-theoretic models of technological advance
naturally attribute this trend to the secular improvement in the speed and quality of commu-
nication.
3. Second-mover advantages. If, as Arrow (1962) assumes, the experi-
ence of early adopters is of help to those that adopt later, ﬁr m sh a v ea n
incentive to delay, and it is not an equilibrium for ﬁr m st oa d o p tan e w
technology en masse; some will adopt right away, and others will choose
to wait, as in models such as Jovanovic and Lach (1989) and Kapur (1993).
4. Lack of awareness. A ﬁrm may not be aware of any or all of the fol-
lowing: (a) that a new technology exists, (b) that it is suitable, or (c) where
to acquire all the complementary goods. Diﬀusion lags then arise because
of search costs, as in Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Jovanovic and Mac-
Donald (1994).13
5. Other diﬀerences among adopters. Given that origins 1–4 provide
adopters a reason to wait, the optimal waiting time of adopters will diﬀer
simply because adopters “are diﬀerent.” For instance, the diﬀusion of hy-
brid corn was aﬀected by economic factors such as the proﬁtability of
corn (relative to other agricultural goods) in the area in question, and the
education of the farmers that resided there (Griliches 1957; Mansﬁeld
1963; Romeo 1975).
Determining the number of entering plants, n0(t). To get a determinate num-
ber of plants of any vintage, the constant returns to scale assumption must
be dropped. Suppose that there are diminishing returns to scale so that 	
1. The proﬁts from operating an age  plant in the current period
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The present value of the ﬂow of proﬁts from bringing a new plant on line
in the current period, t, will read













where r denotes the real interest rate. From equation (14), k0(t)/q(t) 
e[	/(1	)]gqt is the purchase price of the newly installed capital, and (t)  0
e[	/(1	)]gqt is the ﬁxed cost of entry. If there is free entry into production,
then these rents must be driven down to zero so that













Accounting for Growth 195This equation determines the number of new entrants n0(t)i np e r i o dt.
Although n0(t) does not appear directly in this equation, it aﬀects proﬁts
because through equation (12) it aﬀects the wage.
Choosing values for 	 and . In the subsequent analysis, labor’s share of
income will be assumed to equal 70 percent so that 0.70. From the
national income accounts alone it is impossible to tell how the remaining
income should be divided up between proﬁts and the return to capital.
Assume that capital’s share of income is 20 percent, implying that 	
0.20, so that rents will amount to the remaining 10 percent of income. The
real interest rate, r, is taken to be 6 percent.
A parametric diﬀusion curve. In what follows, a particular outcome for the
diﬀusion curve for new inventions is simply postulated, as in Jovanovic
and Lach (1997). Consider a switch in the economy’s technological para-
digm that involves moving from one balanced growth path, with some
constant ﬂow of entrants n*, toward another balanced growth path, with
a constant ﬂow of entrants n**. These ﬂows of entrants should be deter-
mined in line with equation (16). Along the transition path there will be
some ﬂow of new entrants each period. Suppose that the number of plants

















The parameter  controls the initial number of users, or n0(0), while ε
governs the speed of adoption. Assume that 3.5 and ε  0.15. With
this choice of parameter values, it takes approximately twenty-ﬁve years
to reach the 50 percent diﬀusion level, or the point at which about 50 per-
cent of the potential users (as measured by tn** have adopted the new
technology.
Spillover Eﬀects in Learning a Technology
Suppose that a new technological paradigm (for instance, information
technology) is introduced at date t  0, for the ﬁrst time. Better informa-
tion technologies keep arriving, but they all ﬁt into the new paradigm, so
as each new grade is adopted, the economy gains expertise about the entire
paradigm. For someone who adopts a particular technological grade from
this new paradigm, the ease of learning about this particular technological
grade might be related to the cumulative number of users of the paradigm
itself. The more users, the easier it is to acquire the expertise to run a new
technological grade eﬃciently. In particular, let the starting point of the
196 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovicdiﬀusion curve for a particular technological grade within the new para-
digm depend positively on the number of plants that have already adopted
a technology from the new paradigm. This number of adopters is an in-

















where  and   are constants. Observe that z* (a measure of the amount to
be learned on one’s own) is decreasing in t (the time elapsed since the ﬁrst
usage of the new paradigm in question). As t→∞ the spillover term van-
ishes. The strength of the spillover term is increasing in  and decreasing in
 . In the subsequent analysis it will be assumed that 0.4 and  0.02.
6.4.4 An Example: The Third Industrial Revolution
Now, imagine starting oﬀ along a balanced growth path where the rate
of investment-speciﬁc technological progress is g* q . All of a sudden—at a
point in time that will be normalized to t  0—a new technological para-
digm appears that has a higher rate of investment-speciﬁc technological
progress, g** q . Because of the eﬀect of gq on learning, as speciﬁed in equa-
tion (15), learning curves become steeper once the new technological era
dawns.
Perhaps the ﬁrst balanced growth path could be viewed as the trajectory
associated with the second industrial revolution. This period saw the rise
of electricity, the internal combustion engine, and the modern chemical
industry. The second event could be the dawning of the information age,
or the third industrial revolution. What will the economy’s transition path
look like? How does this transition path depend on learning and diﬀusion?
For this experiment let g* q  0.035 and g** q  0.05. Figure 6.3 plots
labor productivity for the economy under study. The straight line depicts
what would have happened to productivity had information technology
not been invented at all. The remarkable ﬁnding is how growth in labor
productivity stalls during the nascent information age. Note that it takes
productivity about thirty or so years to cross its old level.
The importance of learning is shown in ﬁgure 6.4, which plots the transi-
tion path when there are no learning eﬀects. It now takes ten years less for
productivity to cross its old trend path. Last, ﬁgure 6.5 shuts down the
diﬀusion curve. There is still a productivity slowdown due to learning ef-
fects, but it is much weaker. The learning eﬀects in the model are muted for
two reasons. First, it takes no resources to learn. If learning required the
input of labor, intermediate inputs, or capital, the eﬀect would be strength-
ened. Second, in the model labor can be freely allocated across vintages.
Therefore, less labor is allocated to the low productivity plants (such as
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Fig. 6.3 Transitional dynamicsthe new plants coming on-line) and this ameliorates the productivity slow-
down. If each plant required some minimal amount of labor to operate—
another condition that would break Solow (1960) aggregation—then the
learning eﬀects would be stronger. Finally, a key reason for slow diﬀusion
curves is high learning costs, and this channel of eﬀect has been abstracted
away from here. Learning and diﬀusion are likely to be inextricably linked
and therefore diﬃcult to separate, except in an artiﬁcial way, as was done
here.
These ﬁgures make it clear that the vintage capital model can indeed
explain the productivity slowdown if learning and diﬀusion lags matter
enough, and the evidence presented here indicates that they do. Another
appealing feature of the model is that it can also explain the concurrent
rise in the skill premium, and this is the subject of the next section.
6.5 Wage Inequality
As labor-productivity growth slowed down in the early 1970s, wage in-
equality rose dramatically. Recent evidence suggests that this rise in wage
inequality may have been caused by the introduction of new capital goods.
For instance:
1. The era of electricity in manufacturing dawned around 1900. Goldin
and Katz (1998) report that industries that used electricity tended to favor
the use of skilled labor.
Fig. 6.5 Transitional dynamics (immediate diﬀusion)
Accounting for Growth 19914. Unskilled labor’s share of income remains constant, whereas skilled labor’s share in-
creases.
2. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) ﬁnd that the spread of computers
may explain 30 to 50 percent of the growth in the demand for skilled work-
ers since the 1970s.
3. Using cross-country data, Flug and Hercowitz (2000) discover that
an increase in equipment investment leads to a rise both in the demand
for skilled labor and in the skill premium. In a similar vein, Caselli (1999)
documents, from a sample of U.S. manufacturing industries, that since
1975 there has been a strong, positive relationship between changes in an
industry’s capital-labor ratio and changes in its wages.
Theories of how skill interacts with new technology are of two kinds.
The ﬁrst kind of theory emphasizes the role of skill in the use of capital
goods that embody technology. Here it is assumed that technology is em-
bodied in capital goods. This is labelled the capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis. The second hypothesis emphasizes the role of skill in imple-
menting the new technology, referred to as skill in adoption.
6.5.1 Griliches (1969) and Capital-Skill Complementarity
The hypothesis in its original form. In its original form, the hypothesis ﬁts
in well with a minor modiﬁcation of Solow (1956, 1957) that allows for
two kinds of labor instead of one. Suppose, as Griliches (1969) proposed,
that in production, capital is more complementary with skilled labor than
with unskilled labor. Speciﬁcally, imagine an aggregate production func-
tion of the form
yk s u =+ −
− [( ) ],
/() 
 	  	 1
1
where s and u represent inputs of skilled and unskilled labor. Capital and
skill are complements, in the sense that the elasticity of substitution be-
tween them is less than unity if 0. The skill premium, or the ratio of
the skilled to unskilled wage rates, is just the ratio of the marginal products





































Now, suppose that the endowments of skilled and unskilled labor are
ﬁxed. Then, the skill premium will rise whenever the capital stock in-
creases, and so will labor’s share of income.14 Krusell et al. (2000) argue
that an aggregate production function of this type ﬁts the postwar experi-
200 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic15. They estimate that [(1  )/] has grown at a rate of 3.6 percent since the 1970s. This
yields roughly the right magnitude of the increase in the college-high school wage gap.
ence well, provided that k is computed as in the benchmark vintage capital
model of section 6.3: k(t)  ∫
∞
0 esq(t  s)i(t  s)ds.
Shifts in the production structure. In Griliches’s formulation, the skill pre-
mium depends on the supplies of the factors k, s,a n du only. However, the
premium will also change if the adoption of new technology is associated
with a change in the economy’s production structure. This is the tack that
Goldin and Katz (1998) and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) take.
For instance, suppose that the aggregate production function is
(17) yu s k =+ −
− [( ) ].
/() 
 	  	 1
1
Now, a change in k will not aﬀect the skill premium, (∂y/∂s)/(∂y/∂u), other
things equal. But imagine that a new technology, say computers or electric-
ity, comes along that favors skilled relative to unskilled labor. Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1998) operationalize this by assuming that the pro-
duction function shifts in such a way that  drifts downwards.15 This raises
the skill premium. Note that equation (17) is an aggregate production func-
tion. Therefore, a decrease in  aﬀects new and old capital alike, and in-
vestment in new capital is not necessary to implement the technological
progress.
A production structure that shifts toward skilled labor can easily extend
to the case in which investment in new capital is required to implement
new technologies. Suppose, as Solow (1960) does, that technological prog-
ress applies only to new capital goods, and write
yA u sk vv v v v v v =+ −
− [( ) ],
/() 
 	  	 1
1
where yv, uv, sv,a n dkv are the output and inputs of the vintage “v” technol-
ogy, and v is a parameter of the production that is speciﬁc to that technol-
ogy. The newer vintage technologies are better, and so Av is increasing in
v. At each date, there will, in general, be a range of v’s in use, especially if
there is some irreversibility in the capital stock. Now suppose that v is
decreasing in v. That is, better technologies require less unskilled labor.
The adoption of such technologies will raise the skill premium. In this type
of model, the skill premium rises because of technological adoption and
not directly because of a rise in the stock of capital.
Caselli (1997) suggests, instead, that each new technology demands its
own types of skills, skills that may be easier or harder to acquire, relative
to the skills required by older technologies. If the skills associated with a
new technology are relatively hard to learn and if people’s abilities to learn
Accounting for Growth 201diﬀer, a technological revolution may raise income inequality by rewarding
those able enough to work with the new technology.
Matching Workers and Machines
Fixed proportions between workers and machines. The previous arguments
presume that workers diﬀer in skill, or in their ability to acquire it. A
basic implication of the vintage capital model is that a range of vintages
of machines will be in use at any date. Can one somehow turn this implica-
tion into a proposition that workers, too, will be diﬀerent? If a worker
could operate a continuum of technologies and if he could work with in-
ﬁnitesimal amounts of each of a continuum of machines of diﬀerent vin-
tages, the answer would be no, because each worker could operate the
“market portfolio” of machines. As soon as one puts a ﬁnite limit to the
number of machines that a worker can simultaneously operate, however,
the model generates inequality of workers’ incomes. To simplify, assume
that the worker can operate just one machine at a time and, moreover, that
each machine requires just one worker to operate it. In other words, there
are ﬁxed proportions between machines and workers. Under these assump-
tions, inequality in workers’ skills will emerge because of diﬀerential incen-
tives for people to accumulate skills, and it translates into a nondegenerate
distribution of skills. The following is an outline of the argument.
1. Production function. Suppose that one machine matches with one
worker. The output of the match is given by the constant-returns-to-scale
production function y  F(k, s), where k is the eﬃciency level of the ma-
chine, and s is the skill level supplied by the worker. Machine eﬃciency
and skill are complements in that ∂2F/∂k∂s  0.
2. Growth of skills. Let v be the fraction of his or her time that the
worker spends working, and let h denote the level of his or her human cap-
ital. Then s  vh. Suppose that the worker can invest in raising h as fol-
lows: dh/dt  (1  v)h, where 1  v is the fraction of his or her time spent
learning.
3. Growth of machine quality. New machines, in turn, also get better.
In other words, there is investment-speciﬁc technological progress. Sup-
pose that anyone can produce a new machine of quality k according to
the linearly homogenous cost function C(k, k), where k is the average
economy-wide quality of a newly produced machine.
4. Balanced growth. This setup produces a balanced growth path with
some interesting features, as Jovanovic (1998) details. First, it results in
nondegenerate distributions of machine eﬃciency and of worker skill. This
can be true even if everybody was identical initially. It occurs because the
scarcity of resources means that it is not optimal to give everyone the latest
machine. The distributions over capital and skills move rightward over
time. Second, because ∂2F/∂k∂s  0, better workers match with the better
202 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovicmachines according to an assignment rule of the form s ! (k), with !
 0. Third, faster-growing economies should have a greater range over
machine quality and skills.
6.5.2 Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Skill in Adoption
The previous subsection was based on the notion that skilled labor is
better at using a new technology; the alternative view is that skilled labor
is more eﬃcient at adopting a technology and learning it. The original Nel-
son and Phelps (1966) formulation, and its subsequent extensions like Ben-
habib and Spiegel (1994), do not invoke the vintage-capital model. It will
be invoked now.
Evidence on Adoption Costs and Their Interaction with Skill
When a new technology is adopted, output tends to be below normal
while the new technology is learned. Indeed, output will often fall below
that which was attained under the previous technology. In other words,
the adoption of a new technology may carry a large foregone output cost
incurred during the learning period. There is evidence that the use of
skilled labor facilitates this adoption process.
1. Management scientists have found that the opening of a plant is fol-
lowed by a temporary increase in the use of engineers whose job is to get
the production process “up to speed” (Adler and Clark 1991).
2. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) provide evidence for the joint hypothe-
sis that (a) educated workers have a comparative advantage in implement-
ing new technologies, and (b) the demand for educated versus less edu-
cated workers declines as experience is gained with a new technology.
3. In a more recent study of 450 U.S. manufacturing industries from
1960 to 1990, Caselli (1999) ﬁnds that the higher an industry’s nonproduc-
tion-production worker ratio was before 1975 (his measure of initial skill
intensity), the larger was the increase in its capital-labor ratio over 1975 to
1990 period (a measure of the adoption of new capital goods).
Modelling the Role of Skill in Adoption
To implement the idea that skill facilitates the adoption process, let




be the production function for the age  technology, and k and u represent
the amounts of capital and unskilled labor. Assume that the improvement
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with any particular vintage of capital. As the amount of unrealized poten-
tial (1  z) shrinks, it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to eﬀe c ta ni m p r o v e -
ment. The initial condition for z, or its starting value as of when the plant is
operational, is assumed to be inversely related to the rate of technological
progress, gq, in the following way:
zg q 0 =
− #
ξ,
where # and $ are positive parameters.
Such a formulation can explain the recent rise in the skill premium; the
details are in Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997). Suppose that in 1974 the
rate of investment-speciﬁc technological progress rose, perhaps associated
with the development of information technologies. This would have led to
an increase in the demand for skill needed to bring the new technologies
on line. The skill premium would then have risen, other things being equal.
6.6 Three Models of Endogenous Investment-Speciﬁc
Technological Progress
It is simple to endogenize investment-speciﬁc technological progress.
How? Three illustrations based on three diﬀerent engines of growth will
show the way:
1. Learning by doing, as in Arrow (1962).
2. Research in the capital goods sector a ` la Krusell (1998).
3. Human capital investment in the capital goods sector following Pare-
nte (1994).
6.6.1 Solow (1960) Meets Arrow (1962):
Learning by Doing as an Engine of Growth
Arrow (1962) assumes that technological progress stems exclusively
from learning by doing in the capital goods sector. There are no learning
c u r v e so rd i ﬀusion lags in the sector that produces ﬁnal output. In the
capital goods sector, there are no direct costs of improving production
eﬃciency. Instead, a capital goods producer’se ﬃciency depends on cumu-
lative aggregate output of the entire capital goods sector—o r ,w h a ti st h e
same thing, cumulative aggregate investment by the users of capital goods.
Because each producer has a negligible eﬀect on the aggregate output of
capital goods, learning is purely external. The job of casting Arrow’sn o -
tion of learning by doing in terms of Solow’s vintage capital framework
will now start.
Production of ﬁnal goods and accumulation of capital. Population is con-
stant; write the aggregate production function for ﬁnal goods in per capita
204 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic16. In order to simplify things, Arrow’s (1962) assumption that there are ﬁxed, vintage-
speciﬁc proportions between machines and workers in production is dropped. This assump-
tion can lead to the scrapping of capital before the end of its physical life span. (In his
analysis, capital goods face sudden death at the end of their physical life span, unless they
are scrapped ﬁrst, as opposed to the gradual depreciation assumed here.) Also, Arrow as-
sumes that machine producers’ eﬃciency is an isoelastic function of the cumulative number
of machines produced, whereas here it is assumed to be an isoelastic function of the cumula-
tive number of eﬃciency units produced.
terms as c  i  k	, where c, i,a n dk are all per capita values, an innocuous
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Once again, q is the state of technology in the capital goods sector: Anyone
can make q units of capital goods from a unit of consumption goods.
Learning by capital goods producers. Suppose that at date t, q is described
by








where i(t  s) denotes the level of industry-wide investment at date t  s
in consumption units, and q(t  s)i(t  s) is the number of machine eﬃ-
ciency units produced at t  s. In equation (19), as in Arrow’s model, the
productivity of the capital goods sector depends on economy-wide cumu-
lative investment.16
Let  be the mass of identical agents in this economy—the economy’s
“size” or “scale.” Then, in equilibrium, i  i, so that equation (19) be-
comes









Endogenous balanced growth. Assume that consumers’ tastes are de-
scribed by
(21) ec t d t
t − ∞
∫
 ln ( ) .
0
Let gx denote the growth rate of variable x in balanced growth. The pro-
duction function implies that because population is constant, gy 	 gk.
Along a balanced growth path, output of the capital goods sector, or qi,
grows at rate gk so that equation (20) implies that gq  (1 	 )gk.T h u s ,
the price of capital goods, 1/q, falls as output grows.
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L 1. If a balanced growth path exists, gk satisﬁes the equation
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P. First, from equation (18), gk  qi/k. Since gk, and hence
qi/k, must be constant, gk  gq  gi  gq  gy, where the second equality
follows from assuming that consumption and investment are constant frac-
tions of income along the balanced growth path so that gi  gc  gy.
Second, consider the ﬁrst-order condition of optimality for k.Af o r g o n e
unit of consumption can purchase q units of capital that can rent for
	k	1q. This must cover the interest cost, gy, the cost of depreciation,
, and the capital loss gq, because capital goods prices are falling. This
gives the eﬃciency condition 	k	1  (gy  gq)/q  (gk)/
q. Third, in balanced growth, q(t  s)i(t  s)  e(gq  gi)sq(t)i(t) 
egks q(t)i(t). Then, using equation (20), q   1	(qi/gk)1	, which yields
qk	1   1	[(qi/k)/gk]1	. Substituting the fact that gk  (qi/k)i n t o
this expression gives qk	1   1	[(gk  )/gk]1	   1	(1  /gk)1	.
Recalling that 	qk	1  (gk) yields equation (22). Q.E.D.
C 2. There exists a unique and positive solution to equation
(22).
P. The left-hand side of equation (22) is positively sloped in gk,w i t h
intercept  . The right-hand side is negatively sloped, approaching in-
ﬁnity asgkapproacheszero,andapproaching	1	asgkapproachesinﬁn-
ity.Therefore, exactly one solution exists, and it is strictly positive. Q.E.D.
P 3. Scale eﬀect: A larger economy, as measured by ,g r o w s
faster.
P. Anything that raises (lowers) the right-hand side of equation (22)
raises (lowers) gk. Anything that raises (lowers) the left-hand side of equa-
tion (22) lowers (raises) gk.17 Q.E.D.
Example 1. Set capital’s share of income at 30 percent, the rate of time
preference at 4 percent, and the depreciation rate at 10 percent. Hence,
	0.3, 0.04, and 0.10. Now, values are backed out for the
parameters  and  that will imply the existence of an equilibrium in which
capital goods prices fall at 4 percent a year; that is, an equilibrium with
gq  0.04. This leads to the capital stock’sg r o w i n ga tr a t egk  0.04/(1 
206 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic0.3)  0.057. To get this value of gk to solve equation (22), it must transpire
that  and  are such that 1	  0.32.
Applying the model to information technology. The pace of technological
progress in information technologies has been nothing short of incredible.
Consider the cost of processing, storing, and transmitting information.
Jonscher (1994) calculates that between 1950 and 1980 the cost of one MIP
(millions of instructions per second) fell at a rate of somewhere between 27
and 50 percent per year. Likewise, the cost of storing information dropped
at a rate of somewhere between 25 and 30 percent per year from 1960 to
1985. Last, the cost of transmitting information declined at a rate some-
where between 15 and 20 percent per year over the period 1974 to 1994.
Why such a precipitous fall in the cost of information technology?
Arrow’s model gives a precise answer. Information technology is a general
purpose technology, usable in many industries. The scale of demand for
the capital goods embodying it, and hence the cumulative output of these
capital goods, has therefore been large, and this may well have led to a
faster pace of learning and cost reduction.
A more specialized technology such as, say, new coal-mining machinery,
would be speciﬁc to a sector (coal mining) and would, as a result, be de-
manded on a smaller scale. Its cumulative output and investment would
be smaller, and so would its learning-induced productivity gains. In terms
of the model, the value of  for information technologies exceeds the value
of  for coal mining equipment. This amounts to a scale eﬀect on growth.
A higher  hastens the decline in capital goods prices, a fact that proposi-
tion (3) demonstrates.
6.6.2 Solow (1960) Meets Krusell (1997):
Research as an Engine of Growth
In Krusell’s model, the improvement in capital goods comes about
through research.
Final goods producers. The production function for ﬁnal goods, y,i s





where l is the amount of labor employed in the ﬁnal output (or consump-
tion) sector, and kj is the employment of capital of type j. The consumption
sector is competitive and rents its capital from capital goods producers
each period.
Capital accumulation. Each type of capital, j,i sp r o d u c e da n do w n e db ya
monopolist who rents out his stock of machines, kj, on a period-by-period
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where xj is spending by capital goods producer j, measured in consump-
tion units, and qj represents the number of type j machines that a unit
of consumption goods can produce. In other words, qj is the production
eﬃciency of monopolist j.
Research by capital goods producers. Capital goods producer j can raise qj
by doing research. Because the markup the producer charges is propor-
tional to qj, he or she has the incentive to undertake research in order to
raise qj. If the producer hires hj workers to do research, then monopolist j











where R() is an increasing, concave function. The term q  ∫
1
0 qjdj is the
average level of productivity across all sectors, and 
 is an index of the
product-speciﬁc returns to R&D. This term aﬀects incentives to do re-
search (if 
0, no incentive exists), but it does not aﬀect the growth
accounting procedure as long as hj lends itself to measurement.
Symmetric equilibrium. Consider a balanced growth path where each mo-
nopolist is a facsimile of another so that kj  k(t), qj  q(t), and hj  h (t),
etc. The ﬁrst three equations become
(26) yl k =
− 1 		 ,
(27) dk
dt
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Then the capital stock can be represented as







Equation (27) is of the same form as equation (4) of section 6.4, and the
evolution of q now has a speciﬁc interpretation: Investment-speciﬁc tech-
nological progress is driven by research. Note from equation (27) that all
208 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovicnew investment, x(t), is in the frontier technology in the sense that it em-
bodies q(t)e ﬃciency units of productive power per unit of consumption
foregone.
Diﬃculties with research-based models. Although it captures features that
section 6.2 argued were essential for understanding the U.S. growth experi-
ence, there are three problems with Krusell’s model.
1. A predicted secular increase in the growth rate. Equation (28) implies
that the rate of growth in the United States should have risen over time
because in the U.S. data, and for that matter in most economies, h has
trended upwards. Jones (1995) discusses the incongruity of these implica-
tions of research-based models with evidence.
2. A positive scale eﬀect. To see this, take two identical economies and
merge them into a single one that has twice as much labor and capital as
the individual economies did. Now, hold the types of capital producers
constant, because adding more types is tantamount to inventing new capi-
tal goods. If each agent behaves as previously described, then initially y 
2l1	k	. Additionally, each ﬁrm could now use twice as much research la-
bor so that q and k would grow faster. Alternatively, in this hypothetical
experiment one could instead assume (realistically so perhaps) that the
merged economy would have not a monopoly but a duopoly in each ma-
chine market. The consequences of such an assumption are not entirely
clear, however, because the old allocation of labor to research would still
not be an equilibrium allocation in the new economy. Competition in the
machine market would lead to lower proﬁts for the producers of machines,
and this would reduce their incentives to do research and reduce growth.
This would partially oﬀset, and even reverse, the positive eﬀect of scale on
growth. These arguments make clear, moreover, that the scale problem in
this model has nothing whatsoever to do with spillovers in research. The
arguments go through intact even if 
1. The scale eﬀect works through
the impact that a larger product market has on ﬁrms’ incentives to improve
their eﬃciency.
3. The resources devoted to research are small. Most nations report no
resources devoted to research, and only 3 percent or so of U.S. output
oﬃcially goes to R&D. Because so much technology, even in the United
States, is imported from other countries, research-based models make
more sense at the level of the world than they do at the national level.
6.6.3 Solow (1960) Meets Parente (1994):
Vintage Human Capital as an Engine of Growth
Parente (1994) oﬀers a vintage human capital model without physical
capital. This section adds a capital goods sector to his model. Once again,
endogenous technological progress occurs in the capital goods sector only.
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passed onto consumption goods producers in the form of a beneﬁcial “pe-
cuniary external eﬀect”—the falling relative price of capital.
Imagine an economy with two sectors of production: consumption and
capital goods. The consumption goods sector is competitive and enjoys no
technological progress. The productivity growth occurring in this sector
arises because its capital input becomes less expensive over time relative
to consumption goods and relative to labor.
The capital goods sector is competitive too, and its eﬃciency rises over
time. A capital goods producer can, at any time, raise the grade of his
technology, in the style of Zeckhauser (1968) and Parente (1994), but at a
cost. The producer has an associated level of expertise at operating his
grade of technology. This increases over time due to learning by doing. The
proﬁts earned by capital goods producers are rebated back each period to
a representative consumer (who has tastes described by equation (21) and
supplies one unit of labor).
Consumption goods sector. The production function for consumption
goods is
(30) ck l =
− 		 1 ,
where k and l are the inputs of capital and labor. This technology is un-
changing over time.
Capital goods sector. Capital goods are homogeneous, but the technology
for producing them can change at the discretion of the capital goods pro-
ducer. A capital goods producer’s technology is described by o  Azh1	,
where o is the producer’s output of capital goods, A denotes the grade of
the technology the producer is using, z represents the producer’sl e v e lo f
expertise, and h is the amount of labor the producer employs. The price of
capital is represented by p and the wage by w, both in consumption units.
At any date the producer’s labor-allocation problem is static and gives rise
to ﬂow proﬁts given by
















	 	 	 
Learning by doing. Suppose that a producer’s expertise on a given techno-





 =− ≤ ≤ () , , 11 for 0
where  is the amount of time that has passed since the producer adopted
the technology. Observe that while z  1, the producer learns by doing. In
210 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic18. The functional form of the learning curve is taken from Parente (1994). Zeckhauser
(1968) considers a wider class of learning curves.
1 9 .O n ec a v e a to nP a r e n t e ’s model: The choice of A is constrained by the fact that the
level expertise following an adoption z0 cannot be negative. This constraint could be removed
by choosing a diﬀerent form for the loss of expertise caused by upgrading. An example of a
functional form that would accomplish this is z0  (A/A)" (zT  ), where zT is the level
of expertise just before the adoption and "0.
20. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) also focus on human
capital–based absorption costs. These models provide a microfoundation for why switching
costs should be larger when the new technology is more advanced. This implies that when a
ﬁrm does switch to a new technology, it may well opt for a technology that is inside the
frontier. This implication separates the human capital vintage models from their physical
capital counterparts, because the latter all imply that all new investment is in frontier
methods.
Search frictions can also lead ﬁrms to adopt methods inside the technological frontier. In
the models of Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), it generally
does not pay for ﬁrms to invest time and resources to locate the best technology to imitate.
contrast to Arrow’s assumptions, this rate does not depend on the volume
of output, however, but simply on the passage of time. Eventually, the pro-
ducer learns everything and z → 1, which is the maximal level of exper-
tise.18
Let z represent the accumulated expertise of a producer with  years of
experience. With an initial condition z0  z ˜  1, the above diﬀerential
equation has the solution
(31) zz e Z z 

 =− − ≡
− 11 ( ˜)( ˜)
for %0.
Upgrading. A capital goods producer can, at any time, upgrade the tech-
nology he or she uses. If the producer switches from using technology A
to A he or she incurs a switching cost of ("A)/A, measured in terms
of lost expertise. The idea is that the bigger the leap in technology the
producer takes, the less expertise he can carry over into the new situation.
Observe that
1. There is no exogenously speciﬁed technological frontier here. That
is, A is unconstrained,19 and yet producers do not opt for an A that is as
l a r g ea sp o s s i b l e . 20
2. In sharp contrast to Arrow (and to Krusell, unless his 
1), there
is no technological spillover in human capital accumulation across pro-
ducers.
Figure 6.6 plots the evolution of TFP for a producer.
Balanced growth. The balanced growth path will be uncovered through a
guess-and-verify procedure. To this end, suppose that the economy is in
balanced growth at date zero. It seems reasonable to conjecture that con-
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grow at constant rates, denoted as before by gc, gi, gy,a n dgk. If consump-
tion and investment are to remain a constant fraction of income, then gc 
gi  gy. From equation (30), gy 	 gk.
Properties of the conjectured steady-state growth path.
1. Each capital goods producer will choose to upgrade A after interval
T and by a factor $. Neither T nor $ depends on time. Deﬁne gA by $
e
gAT. Then gA  (1/T)l n$ is the average growth rate of each producer’s A.
2. At a point in time the age of the technologies in use are uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, T], with 1/T producers using each type
of technology.
3. All producers using a technology of given grade have the same level
of expertise.
4. z0 solves the equation z0  ZT(z0) " $ .
By properties 1 and 2, the distribution of technologies will be shifting
continually to the right over time, and the maximal technological grade in
use at time t,o rA0(t), will grow exponentially: A0(t)  A0(0)e
gAt. Let A
denote the level of technology that was upgraded  periods ago. Then from
the viewpoint of the producer that is using it,  is the age of the technology
A. Then properties 1 and 2 also imply that A(t)  A0(t)e
gA.I nas t e a d y
state, (1/A[t])(dA[t]/dt)  gA for all . The normalization A0(0)  1 will be
employed in what follows.
Fig. 6.6 Evolution of productivity
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where i is aggregate investment measured in consumption units and p is
the price of capital in terms of consumption. The left-hand side of equa-
tion (32) implies that the output of capital goods grows at the rate gk 
gA, given that h is constant over time (a fact demonstrated below). In
growth-rate form, equation (32) then reads gp  gi  gk. If investment is
to remain a constant fraction of income, gi  gy must hold. Therefore, gp 
gy  gk  (1 	 )gA.
It is easy to establish that distribution of labor remains constant across
g r a d e s .T h a ti s ,h(t) will not depend on t. Optimal labor hiring in the
consumption goods sector implies that (1 	 )(k/l)	  w. If wages grow at
the same rate as output, gy 	 gk, then l will be constant over time. Like-
wise, a capital goods producer using an age  technology will hire labor
according to the condition (1 	 )h	
  w/(pAz). Because gp  (1 
	)gA and gA  gk, the right-hand side of this expression is constant over
time, and, therefore, so is h.
Producer’s problem. In balanced growth, prices and wages grow at constant
rates as a function of t, which therefore plays the role of the “aggregate
state.” To a capital goods producer, the state variables are his expertise, z,
and his technological grade, A. Hence the Bellman equation pertaining to
his decision problem is
VAzt AZ z se d s
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where &(A, Zst (z); s)  [A, Zst(z), p(s), w(s)]. The interest rate r is
presumed to be constant.
A stationary (s, S) upgrading policy. One still needs to verify that the bal-
anced growth equilibrium has the property, conjectured in (1), that capital
goods producers choose to upgrade A by a constant factor $, and after a
constant waiting time, T. If so, then there exists an (s, S)p o l i c yo nt h e
interval [z0, zT] so that z always starts from z0 % 0 (just after a technologi-
cal upgrade) and increases up to the point zT  1, which triggers the next
upgrade, a return of z to z0, and so on. To show that the balanced growth
path is of this form, the following property of the proﬁt function is helpful.
Accounting for Growth 213L 4. Let a(t)  A/A0(t). For s % t, &(A, z; s)  e	gAt![a(t), z, s  t].
P. Because gp  (1 	 )gA and gw 	 gA, it follows that proﬁts
for period s, &(A, z; s), can be expressed as [	(1 	 )/w(s)](1	)/	[p(s)Az]1/	
 e(1/	)gAta(t)(1/	)z(1/	)  c(0)e[(1	)/	1	]gAs, where c(0) is a constant whose
value depends on some time-0 variables. Next, using the fact that
(1/	)  [(1 	 )/	1 	 ] 	allows the statement &(A, z; s) 
e	gAta(t)(1/	)z(1/	)  c(0)e[(1	)/	1	]gA(st) to be written. Finally, the claim fol-
lows by setting ![a(t), z, s  t]  a(t)(1/	)z(1/	)  c(0)e[(1	)/	1	]gA(st).
Q.E.D.
Let aA/A0(t  T). Then because A0(t)  egAt and A/A  [a/a]
[A0(t  T)/A0(t)]  egAT(a/a), the Bellman equation becomes
Va e zt e aZ z s te d s
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Now observe that after a change of variable x  s  t, ∫
tT
t !(a, Zst(z),
s  t)er(st)ds  ∫
T
0 !(a, Zx(z), x)erxdx. Then, if one writes B(a, z; t) 
e	gAtV(ae
gAt, z, t), the Bellman equation becomes
(1 ) ′ = [
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P 5. The upgrading policy is stationary.
P. Consider equation (1). For 0, one can bound the optimal
policy T away from zero. Now, because 	gA is the growth of consumption,
optimal savings behavior by consumers implies that r 	 gA  0.21 There-
fore, the operator is a contraction, and by starting an iteration with a func-
tion B that does not depend on t,o n eﬁnds that the unique ﬁxed point,
B(a, z)d o e sn o td e p e n do nt. Denote the optimal decision rules by T(a, z)
and a(a, z). Since T and a do not depend on t, upgrading by each pro-
ducer will be periodic and by the same multiple. This is all conditional on
the existence of a balanced growth path. Q.E.D.
Deﬁnition of balanced growth. For a balanced growth path to exist there
must be a triple ($, T, z0) such that, for all t,
() ( ,) , 33 1 0 ′ = Tz T
21. Suppose that tastes are described by equation (21). Then, along a balanced growth
path, r gy 	 gk.H e n c e ,r 	 gk  .
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and
() () . 35 00 zZ z T =− − " $
In this case, output, consumption, and investment grow at the rate





  ln .
Together, equations (33)–(35) imply that an economy that starts on the
steady-state growth path described by properties 1–4, given earlier in sec-
tion 6.6.3, remains on it. Equations (33) and (34) pertain to the optimal
behavior of a producer right after he has upgraded his technology. Right
after an upgrade, the producer has a technology A  A0(t) and hence a 
1. He must then choose to wait T periods (equation [33]) and, at that point,
he must choose to upgrade A by a constant factor $ (equation [34]). Finally,
given the T and $ that he has chosen, his expertise must be the same after
each upgrade (equation [35]).
The changeover process. The above model generates a balanced growth
path along which income grows and the relative price of capital falls. Tech-
nological progress in the capital goods sector is endogenous. At each point
in time there is a distribution of capital goods producers, using a variety
of production techniques. Each capital goods producer decides when to
upgrade his technology. Because there is a cost of doing so, in terms of
loss of expertise, he will economize on the frequency of doing this. In the
real world such adoption costs may be quite high, implying that the
changeover process will be slow.22
Salter (1966) noted some time ago that the changeover process at the
plant level is slow. He quotes Hicks as stating that an “entrepreneur by in-
vesting in ﬁxed capital equipment gives hostages to fortune. So long as the
plant isin existence, the possibilityof economizing by changingthe method
or scale of production is small; but as the plant comes to be renewed it
will be in his interests to make a radical change” (4). The above model
captures this process, but here the capital investment is in knowledge.
As evidence of the slow changeover process, consider table 6.1, com-
piled by Salter (1966). The ﬁrst column presents labor productivity for
plants using the best-practice or the most up-to-date techniques at the
time. Average labor productivity across all plants is reported in the second
column. As Salter (1966) notes,
22. This type of model may have some interesting transitional dynamics. Imagine starting
oﬀ with some distribution of technologies where producers are bunched up around some
particular technique. What economic forces will come to bear to encourage them not to all
upgrade around the same date in the future? How long will it take for the distribution to
smooth out?
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best-practice productivity. If all plants were up to best-practice stan-
dards known and in use, labor productivity would have doubled imme-
diately. In fact, a decade and a half elapsed before this occurred, and in
the meantime the potential provided by best-practice productivity had
more than doubled. (6)
Salter’s (1966) ﬁndings have weathered time well, for, in a recent study
of plants’ TFP in 21 four-digit textile industries, Dwyer (1998) ﬁnds that
average TFP among the second (from top) decile divided by the average
TFP among the ninth-decile plants (a procedure that is relatively insensi-
tive to outliers) falls between 2 and 3.
6.7 Conclusions: Solow (1956, 1957) versus Solow (1960)
Forty years ago, Solow wrote some classic papers on economic growth.
In the classic Solow (1956) paper, technological progress rained down
from heaven. The invention of new techniques and their implementation
were free. Technological progress aﬀected the productivity of all factors of
production, capital and labor, both new and old, alike. By contrast, in
Solow (1960) technological advance was embodied in the form of new
capital goods. Its implementation is not free because one must invest to
realize the beneﬁts from it. This form of technological advance is dubbed
investment speciﬁc.
So, which framework is better? It is argued here that the Solow (1960)
vintage capital model is. First, over the postwar period there has been
tremendous technological advance in the production of new capital goods.
The relative price of capital goods has declined at about 4 percent per year.
Second, the variation in productivity across plants in the United States is
tremendous. It is hard to believe that some of this is not due to diﬀerences
in capital goods employed. In fact, Bahk and Gort (1993) have found that
a one-year change in the average age of capital is associated with a 2.5 to
3.5 percent change in a plant’s output. Now, there is evidence suggesting
Table 6.1 Best and Average Practice in the U.S. Blast Furnace Industry (tons of
pig iron per man-hour, 1911–26)









216 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovicthat the pace of investment-speciﬁc technological progress has picked up
since the 1970s with the advent of information technologies. Supposing
that this is true, variants of the Solow (1960) framework, modiﬁed to incor-
porate implementation costs and skilled labor, can go some way in ex-
plaining the recent productivity slowdown and the rise in wage inequality.
Why does the source of technological progress matter? It may have im-
plications for economic growth, unemployment, or other issues that soci-
ety cares about. For example, if technological progress is embodied in the
form of new capital goods, then policies that reduce the costs of acquiring
new equipment (such as investment tax credits for equipment buyers or
R&D subsidies for equipment producers) may stimulate growth.23
Appendix
Data Deﬁnitions and Sources
The sample period is 1948–92, and all data are annual. Real income, y,
is deﬁned as nominal GDP minus nominal gross housing product deﬂated
by the implicit price deﬂator for personal consumption expenditure on
nondurables and nonhousing services. The GDP series were obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (STAT-USA website), and the prices
series were taken from CITIBASE. Real private sector nonresidential net
capital stock, k, and its equipment and structures components (ke and ks,
respectively), were again downloaded from the BEA. Total private sector
hours employed, l, is obtained from CITIBASE (series name LHOURS).
Labor share, 1 	 , was constructed by dividing nominal total compensa-
tion of employees by nominal income minus nominal proprietor’s income.
The data are again from the BEA website. The (standard) rate of techno-
logical progress is calculated by using
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1949
with z1948  1.
The price index for producer’s durable equipment is taken from Gordon
(1990, until 1983, and Krusell et al. 2000 after 1983). The relative price of
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23. Stimulating growth does not necessarily improve welfare. The sacriﬁce in terms of
current consumption may be prohibitively high.equipment, p, is calculated by deﬂating this price index by the consumer
price index. Investment-speciﬁc technological progress, q, is then just
equal to 1/p.
To calculate the ke series used in section 6.3, a discrete approximation
to equation (6) is used. The starting point for the equipment series was
taken to be the value for ke implied by the model’s balanced-growth path
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11 1 
where ie is nominal gross private domestic ﬁxed investment in producer’s
durable equipment (from the BEA website) deﬂated by the price index for
personal consumption expenditure on nondurables and non-housing ser-
vices.
The Mismeasurement of Neutral Technological
Progress in Traditional Growth Accounting
To simplify, assume that the labor force is constant. Now, suppose that a
growth accountant failed to incorporate investment-speciﬁc technological
progress into his analysis. He would construct his capital stock series ac-
cording to
()
˜ ˜. A1 dk
dt
ik =− 
This corresponds to measuring the stock of capital at historical cost in
output units. Using equation (2), he would obtain the following series de-
scribing neutral technological progress:
gg g zy k ˜ ˜. =− 	
Because by assumption all growth in output must derive from growth in
the capital stock, it must transpire from equation (3) that gy 	 gk so that
gg g zk k ˜ ˜ () . =− 	
Hence, any change in the measured Solow residual arises solely from mis-
measurement in the capital stock. To gain an understanding of this equa-
tion, suppose that the economy was gliding along a balanced growth path.
From equations (4) and (A1), it is clear that in this situation, gk  gk ˜  gq,
implying gz ˜ 	 gq. Although the growth accountant may have killed oﬀ
investment-speciﬁc technological progress in his misspeciﬁcation of the
law of motion of capital, it has resurrected itself in the form of neutral
technological progress.
The model demands that GDP should be measured in consumption
218 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovicunits, the numeraire. Doing so is important. What would happen if the
growth accountant used standard real GDP numbers? Speciﬁcally, let
GDP be measured as
˜ , ycp q i =+
where p is some base year price for capital goods. Applying equation (2),
the growth accountant would obtain
(A2) gg ggg zy kyy ˜˜ ˜ . =− =− 	
The diﬀerence in the growth rates between the traditional measure of






















Along a balanced growth path gc  gi  gy. Because q is growing, it must
therefore transpire that (c/y ˜) → 0a n d(piq/y ˜) → 1. Hence, asymptotically
gggg g yi q y q ˜ , =+ = +
so that from equation (A2), gz ˜  gq.
Once again, investment-speciﬁc technological progress has masquer-
aded itself as neutral technological progress.
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Comment Barry Bosworth
This paper is a very coherent survey of a set of recent growth models
that have attempted to extend Solow’s contributions to growth theory. The
authors are able to integrate within the framework of a formal model many
of the ideas that have been put forth as explanations for the post-1973 pro-
ductivity slowdown. They also develop a very interesting model in which
they stress the role of embodied technical change.
They identify three issues that they believe cannot be fully explained
within Solow’s original one-sector growth model (1956): (a) the post-1973
slowdown, (b) the falling relative price of capital, and (c) the rising relative
wage premium for skilled labor. They argue that the ﬁrst is due to the
high costs of implementing the new technologies and the second to rapid
technical growth in the capital goods producing industry, and that the
increased skill premium is a reﬂection of greater complementarity between
the new capital and skilled labor. All of these conclusions are plausible
and have been argued in various forms by others; but we suﬀer from a
shortage not of possible explanations, but of evidence on which explana-
tions are true. Let me address the authors’ explanations in reverse order.
Wage Dispersion
The authors are certainly right to point to the sharp widening of wage
inequality as a dramatic new feature of economic change over the last
quarter century, and we can agree that technology is part of the explana-
tion for a change in the distribution of labor demand by skill level, but its
linkage to the productivity slowdown may be more tenuous. Nearly all
industrial countries have had a productivity slowdown, but only a few have
experienced a widening of the wage distribution. At the international level,
it is interesting to note that countries with high growth rates seem to have
narrower wage distributions. In addition, the dispersion of U.S. wage rates
has increased in more dimensions than skill, suggesting that it is not only
ar e ﬂection of an increased skill bias in technical change. Finally, if the
dominant change were computers and similar technologies, I would expect
it to rebound to the advantage of the young, who, it is said, ﬁnd it easier
to adapt; yet the age proﬁle seems to have become more steep, and the
widening of the wage distribution is concentrated among the young.
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222 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan JovanovicRelative Price of Capital
The decline in the relative price of capital clearly indicates the need to
use, at a minimum, a two-sector vintage model that distinguishes between
capital and consumption goods to reﬂect sharply diﬀerent rates of TFP
growth between the two sectors.
In the discussion of embodiment, technical change is viewed as raising
the quality and thus the real value of new capital. That is the perspective
adopted with the introduction of the new price index for computers: a
hedonic price index focused on computers of equivalent quality. What is
TFP growth to the capital goods industry is rising capital inputs and slow-
ing TFP growth to the consumption goods sector.
In the new national accounts data, total TFP growth is near zero,
whereas the growth of manufacturing (read computers) TFP has returned
to the high rates of the pre-1973 period. Hence, the growth of TFP in non-
manufacturing(services) must be negative. From the perspective of overall
TFP, the new price index for capital is essentially a timing adjustment: ﬁrst
raising the TFP growth rate for manufacturing and then substituting a
higher rate of growth of capital services for nonmanufacturing.
This is the same issue raised in a broader context by Gordon when he
argued for much lower rates of price increase for equipment prices in the
1960s and 1970s. The authors of this paper make use of Gordon’s price
data to measure technical change; but normally that would require the
construction of a new set of investment, capital, and output accounts, as
was done with the introduction of the price deﬂator for computers. Again,
the quality adjustment would raise the level of output in the capital goods
industry; but, because it implies a higher future level of capital services, it
lowers TFP growth in the consumption goods sector.
The authors avoid this process by deﬁning a new measure of real output
as nominal GDP deﬂated by the price index for consumption goods, nei-
ther of which is changed by the use of the Gordon data. The new price
index changes only the real magnitude of the capital input. By their mea-
sure, the relative price of equipment declined to about one-sixth its 1950
level by 1990 (ﬁg. 6.2). Using the price deﬂators of the current national ac-
counts, the corresponding ﬁgure would be about two-thirds. Thus, the use
of the Gordon data raises their concept of technological change roughly
fourfold over the 1950–90 period. Although this is a dramatic story for the
capital goods industry, we should wonder why the producers of consumer
goods perform so poorly, given the large quantities of eﬀective capital.
The Productivity Slowdown
The real puzzle is why the rate of TFP growth in the consumption sector
(services) is near zero (or negative). The authors attribute this to the high
costs of implementing the new technologies. I agree that the diﬀusion lags
for formerly new technologies were surprisingly long, but we should distin-
Accounting for Growth 223guish between the lag due to the slow introduction of the technology—
purchase of the machine—versus the costs and time required to learn to
use them. Only the latter reduces productivity. I ﬁnd it hard to believe
that the second category of lag is so important that an acceleration of
technological change has the perverse eﬀect of reducing the growth of
TFP. The post-1973 slowdown is extraordinarily broad across industries,
including those that would seem to make little use of the new information
technologies. I think the model is very interesting, but in the end it does
not provide an answer; it changes the question.
224 Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic